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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Marco Jimenez appeals from district court's Judgment of Conviction Upon a Plea 
of Guilty to One Felony Count and Order of Retained Jurisdiction, I.C. § 19-2601(4), 
I.C.R. 33(b), and Order of Commitment. Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district court erred 
in denying his request for funds to hire an expert to assist him in his motion to suppress 
and with his defense. Mr. Jimenez further asserts that the district court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress. This Reply Brief is necessary to address some misconceptions 
and arguments made by the State in its Respondent's Brief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Jimenez's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Jimenez's request for 
funds to hire an expert to explain factors that would affect Deputy Moore's ability 
to perceive what he claimed he saw when Deputy Moore's purported 
observations were vital to the district court's denial of Mr. Jimenez's motion to 
suppress, in violation of Mr. Jimenez's Fourteenth Amendment Right to due 
process? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Jimenez's motion to suppress as 
Deputy Moore's suspicion upon which he justified his warrantless stop was not 
objectively reasonable? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Jimenez's Reauest For 
1 Funds To Hire An Expert To Explain Factors That Would Affect Deputv Moore's Ability 
I To Perceive What He Claimed He Saw When Deputv Moore's Purported Observations 
Were Vital To The District Court's Denial Of Mr. Jimenez's Motion To Suppress. In 
- 
1 Violation Of Mr. Jimenez's Fourteenth Amendment Riqht To Due Process 
A. Introduction 
As articulated in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion for expert funds that would have been used 
I 
1 to hire Dr. Marc Green, Ph.D., who would have provided testimony about factors that 
would influence a person's ability to make the observations Deputy Moore claimed to 
I 
1 
make, under the conditions upon which he claimed to make them. In addressing this 
I 
i claim, the State incorporated the district court's memorandum decision and order and 
1 attached the written decision as Appendix A to the Respondent's Brief. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.7.) However, the State made further arguments in support of the district court's 
finding. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.) Mr. Jimenez now addresses the State's 
additional arguments and clarifies his own. 
B. Because Mr. Jimenez Reauested The Funds To Hire Dr. Green With The Intent 
Of Having Him Testifv During His Suppression Hearinq, Mr. Jimenez Concedes 
That Detenninina Whether Dr. Green's Testimonv Would Assist The Trier Of Fact 
Was Not, In And Of Itself, Inconsistent With The Olin Standards Under The Facts 
Of This Case 
In a footnote, the State asserts, "It is unclear to the state how, as Jimenez seems 
to contend, the proffered testimony could fail to 'assist the trier of fact' under I.R.E. 702, 
yet be considered 'necessary services' under I.C. § 19-852." (Respondent's Brief, p.9, 
n.3.) Generally, by its plain language, where a criminal defendant requests funds to hire 
an expert, the defendant must show neither that the expert will testify, nor that the 
expert's testimony will be admissible, in order to satisfy the provisions of I.C. § 19-852. 
I.C. § 19-852(a)(2) ("A needy person ... who is under formal charge of having 
committed ... a serious crime, is entitled ... to be provided with the necessary services 
and facilities of representation (including investigation and other preparation).") 
Furthermore, the Rules of Evidence are generally not applicable in determining 
preliminary questions of fact necessary to determine the admissibility of evidence when 
the district court is the trier of fact. I.R.E. 101(e)(l); I.R.E. 104(a). However, in this 
case, because Mr. Jimenez specifically requested funds to hire Dr. Green in order to 
provide his testimony, he recognizes that the district court's consideration of whether 
Dr. Green's testimony would "assist the trier of fact," in and of itself, was not 
inconsistent with the Olin standards. Mr. Jimenez continues to assert, however, that the 
district court abused its discretion in denying his request for funds. 
C. Despite The State's Apparent Arqument To The Contrarv. The District Court 
Applied I.R.E. 702 In Rulinq On Mr. Jimenez's Motion For Expert Funds 
The State appears to argue that the district court did not rely upon I.R.E. 702 
when ruling on Mr. Jimenez's request for funds to hire Dr. Green. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.7-10.) Initially, it should be noted that Mr. Jimenez does not (nor did he in his 
Appellant's Brief) assert that the district court relied solely upon I.R.E. 702 "instead of 
the due process and equal protection standard provided in State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 
394, 648 P.2d 203, 206 (1982)." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) In fact, Mr. Jimenez 
recognizes that "the district court analyzed the claim in light of I.C. § 19-852 and Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 702 ...". (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) 
However, the district court unequivocally relied upon I.R.E. 702 in ruling against 
Mr. Jimenez's motion. While recognizing that the district court cited and quoted 1.R.E 
702 in the "Applicable Law" section of its decision, the State argues that the district 
court made no reference to I.R.E. 702 in its "Analysis and Decision" section. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.8, 9 n.2.) The State is incorrect. 
In the "Analysis and Decision" portion of its memorandum, the district court 
stated: 
The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what he observed at night 
while the vehicles were passing each other and then through his rearview 
mirror after the vehicles had passed can, if necessary to decide this case, 
be determined by the court without the assistance of an expert 
witness. 
(R., p.78; see also Respondent's Brief - Appendix A; see also Respondent's Brief, p.10 
(quoting the above section).) While it is true that the district court did not specifically 
cite to I.R.E. 702 in its "Analysis and Decision" section,' the district court's chosen 
words reveal indisputably that the district court applied 1.R.E 702, the evidentiary rule 
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony, in ruling on its motion. (Compare 
I.R.E. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise") with R., p.78 ("The accuracy of the deputy's 
statements about what he observed that night ... can ... be determined by the court 
without the assistance of an expert").) In sum, the State's apparent assertion that the 
district court did not employ the I.R.E. 702 standard, is without merit. 
D. Dr. Green's Testimony Would Assist The Trier Of Fact In Determininq The 
Accuracy, Not Merely The Veracity, Of Deputy Moore's Testimonv, And The 
District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denyins Mr. Jimenez's I.C. 6 19-852 
Reauest 
In addressing the claim raised by Mr. Jimenez in his Appellant's Brief that the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence don't apply to preliminary questions of fact where the district 
court is the trier of fact, the State argues that "even if the district court had based its 
decision to deny funds for an expert witness at Jimenez's suppression hearing solely on 
I.R.E. 702, such a ruling would not run counter to I.R.E. 101 and 104 -the admission of 
Deputy Moore's testimony (vis-a-vis the weight) was not predicated upon the expert 
witness's proffered testimony." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) The State further argues that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding "that the testimony of an expert to 
challenge the credibility of Deputy Moore's observations at the suppression hearing was 
not necessary." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) It is important to note that Mr. Jimenez did 
not proffer Dr. Green's testimony to challenge the admissibility of Deputy Moore's 
testimony, nor his credibility in the sense that he was committing perjury; rather, the 
proffered testimony was centered upon whether Deputy Moore's claimed observations 
were wrong due to the conditions under which the observations were made. Counsel 
for Mr. Jimenez argued: 
The expert which I have contacted is an individual by the name of Mar[c] 
Green, PHD. I attached copies of his curriculum vitae to my motion. . . 
He's had research awards on special and visual affects, illumination on 
' The district court did not cite to I.C. !j 19-852 in its "Analysis and Decision" section 
either. 
pilot performance with the U.S. Air Force, he's also had a biomedical 
science research grant on the effects of illuminants on the detection of 
vertical and oblique stimuli. He's done publications on reaction time: Is it 
a gun or a wallet, involving perceptual factors . . . He's also done work on 
adaptation affects on the brightness and darkness of brief illuminate 
changes, which is exactly what we are dealing with here. 
(Tr., 3/9/07, p.17, L.18 - p.18, L. l l . )  Counsel for Mr. Jimenez argued that while the 
court could determine the relative speed of the two vehicles and the lighting conditions, 
Dr. Green's proffered testimony was not limited to making such determinations; rather, 
Dr. Green's testimony would explain how these factors would affect Deputy Moore's 
ability to make the observations themselves. (Tr., 3/9/07, p.15, L.3 - p.19, L.7, p.23, L.7 
- p.25, L.20.) As a parallel, where a defendant challenges the ability of a witness to 
provide an in-court identification based upon a claim that the circumstances surrounding 
a previous out-of-court identification were suggestive and create a substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification, the defendant does not challenge the "credibility" of the 
witness in the sense that the defendant avers the witness is intentionally lying; rather, 
the defendant challenges the "credibility" of the identification itself, i.e., whether it 
stemmed from the witness's actual observations or from the suggestions inherent in the 
conduct of the out-of-court identification process. See generally, Neil v. Biggers, 409 
U.S. 188 (1972). 
While the court (and the State) were correct in their observations that the "speed 
and distance dynamics were already before the court" (Respondent's Brief, p.10), the 
"adaptation affects on the brightness and darkness of brief illuminate changes," for 
example, were not. The credibility issue the district court was required to determine 
was Deputy Moore's capacity to make the purported observations, not his veracity for 
either testifying truthfully or lying to justify his illegal action. Mr. Jimenez's arguments in 
support of a finding that Dr. Green's testimony would, in fact, assist the trier of fact are 
more fully articulated in the Appellant's Brief and need not be repeated in further detail 
in this Reply Brief. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Jimenez's Motion To Suppress As Deputy 
Moore's Suspicion Upon Which He Justified His Warrantless Stop Was Not Obiectively 
Reasonable 
A. Introduction 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Jimenez asserted, as he does now, that "taking all of 
Deputy Moore's statements as true, he lacked an objectively reasonable articulable 
suspicion to stop the car in which Mr. Jimenez was riding." (Appellant's Brief, pp.18- 
19.) In its Respondent's Brief, the State summarily describes Deputy Moore's purported 
observation of the actions of the passengers as "panicked scrambling action," while 
concurrently attacking Mr. Jimenez's summary description of Deputy Moore's purported 
observations as "nervousness" and asserts that Mr. Jimenez's argument "strains 
credulity." The State's argument is without merit. 
B. Renardless Of Whether The Actions Alleged To Have Been Seen Bv Deputy 
Moore Are Described As "Nervousness" Or "Panicked Scramblina," Deputy 
Moore Did Not Have A Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That The Occupants Of 
The Car He Stowed Without A Warrant Were Involved In The Robbberv 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Jimenez summarized Deputy Moore's observations 
and asserted that he merely had a hunch that the occupants of the car he stopped were 
involved in the robbery, and did not have an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion 
of the same. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-28.) Regarding Deputy Moore's observations of 
the occupant's of the car (the observations that he made in an instant, at night, going 
from darkness into an artificially lit area of the highway, traveling at a relative 112 feet 
per second, first toward, and then away from him), Mr. Jimenez asserted that 
"[p]resumably, Deputy Moore found that the passengers were nervous because they 
saw he was a cop." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) The State takes issue with this argument. 
The State asserts that, in making this argument, Mr. Jimenez was merely setting 
up a "straw man" and further that this argument "strains credulity." (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.20, 21.) The State asserts, "Deputy Moore's testimony did not describe mere 
'nervousness' or vaguely relate he had seen 'furtive' movements by the occupants in 
the vehicle." (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) Rather, the state argues, "Deputy Moore's 
testimony clearly described a scene of panicked scrambling action on the part of the 
four men inside the vehicle." (Respondent's Brief, p.21 (emphasis added).) 
Mr. Jimenez must admit that Deputy Moore never used the term "nervous" in his 
description of the occupants of the car. However, he also never used the words, 
"panicked" or "scrambling," either alone or in concert. (See Tr., 4/16/07 p.48, Ls.13-22; 
p.55, L.7 - p.56, L.4 as cited in the Respondent's Brief, p.21.) Neither did the district 
court. (Tr., 4/16/07, p.84, L . l l  - p.90, L.lO.) The district court found, "this officer saw 
all four turn and look at him as he went by at a relatively slow speed; and then 
according to this officer these individuals acted particularly nervous, like moving in 
excitement ...". (Tr., 4/16/07, p.88, Ls.22-25 (emphasis added) see also Respondent's 
Brief, p.17 (including the above quotation).) Thus, even if describing the passengers as 
engaging in "panicked scrambling action" were enough to overcome the presumption 
that the warrantless seizure was unreasonable, Deputy Moore did not describe, nor did 
the district court find, that the passengers were engaged in such behavior. 
Regardless of whether Deputy Moore, as argued by the State, described the 
passengers as engaged in "panicked scrambling action" or whether Deputy Moore, as 
argued by Mr. Jimenez and found by the district court, described some degree of 
"nervousness," this Court must determine whether the facts as found by the district 
court, and reviewed under a totality of the circumstances, show that Deputy Moore had 
an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupants of the car he stopped 
without a warrant were involved in the robbery. Mr. Jimenez's argument in support of a 
finding that Deputy Moore's suspicion was no more than a hunch and that he therefore 
violated Mr. Jimenez's right to be free from unreasonable seizures, is more fully 
articulated in the Appellant's Brief. 
C. Deputv Moore Did Not Observe Anv Of The Passenaers In The Car Remove 
Clothing, Hide Weapons. Or Secure Items They Did Not Want Found 
One more point alluded to in the Respondent's Brief needs to be clarified. 
Deputy Moore did not testify that he observed any of the passengers of the car actually 
"remov[ing] clothes, hid[ing] weapons, [or] secur[ing] items that they [did not] want to be 
found." (Tr., 4/16/07, p.56, Ls.1-4.) The State references Deputy Moore's testimony on 
this subject and recognizes that, according to Deputy Moore, the conduct only 
"suggested" the passengers "might be" removing clothing, hiding weapons, or securing 
items they did not want found, but did not assert that he actually observed any nefarious 
hiding, etc. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16, 18, 21.) However, Mr. Jimenez asserts that the 
speculative nature of Deputy Moore's testimony must be emphasized. Deputy Moore 
merely stated that that hiding weapons etc. is one possible reason for people to "[jump] 
around or [move] around in a car really fast." (Tr., 4/16/07, p.55, L.19 - p.56, L.4.) 
Even through his training and experience, Deputy Moore's observation of what people 
who 'lump around in a car really fast" might "possibly" be doing is the definition of a 
hunch. 
- CONCLUSION 
I Mr. Jimenez respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction, reverse the district court's order denying his request for appropriation of 
funds for an expert, reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress, and remand 
1 the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
I 
DATED this 3oth day of December, 2008. 
~ / ~ u t ~  S ate Appellate Public Defender 
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